Publications from conferences, workshops, and journals are listed below. Please also see the NDN Technical Reports and Technical Presentations.
2022
Yu, Tianyuan; Xie, Hongcheng; Liu, Siqi; Ma, Xinyu; Jia, Xiaohua; Zhang, Lixia
CertRevoke: A Certificate Revocation Framework for Named Data Networking Proceedings Article
In: Proceedings of the 9th ACM Conference on Information-Centric Networking, pp. 80–90, Association for Computing Machinery, Osaka, Japan, 2022, ISBN: 9781450392570.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: certificate revocations, Security, trust management
@inproceedings{yu2022certrevoke:,
title = {CertRevoke: A Certificate Revocation Framework for Named Data Networking},
author = {Tianyuan Yu and Hongcheng Xie and Siqi Liu and Xinyu Ma and Xiaohua Jia and Lixia Zhang},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1145/3517212.3558079},
doi = {10.1145/3517212.3558079},
isbn = {9781450392570},
year = {2022},
date = {2022-01-01},
urldate = {2022-01-01},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the 9th ACM Conference on Information-Centric Networking},
pages = {80–90},
publisher = {Association for Computing Machinery},
address = {Osaka, Japan},
series = {ICN '22},
abstract = {Named Data Networking (NDN) secures network communications by requiring all data packets to be signed upon production. This requirement makes usable and efficient NDN certificate issuance and revocation essential for NDN operations. In this paper, we first investigate and clarify core concepts related to NDN certificate revocation, then proceed with the design of CertRevoke, an NDN certificate revocation framework. CertRevoke utilizes naming conventions and trust schema to ensure certificate owners and issuers legitimately produce in-network cacheable records for revoked certificates. We evaluate the security properties and performance of CertRevoke through case studies. Our results show that deploying CertRevoke in an operational NDN network is feasible.},
keywords = {certificate revocations, Security, trust management},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {inproceedings}
}
Yu, Tianyuan; Xie, Hongcheng; Liu, Siqi; Ma, Xinyu; Jia, Xiaohua; Zhang, Lixia
CertRevoke: a certificate revocation framework for named data networking Proceedings Article
In: Proceedings of the 9th ACM Conference on Information-Centric Networking, pp. 80–90, Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, 2022, ISBN: 978-1-4503-9257-0.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: certificate revocations, Security, trust management
@inproceedings{yu_certrevoke_2022,
title = {CertRevoke: a certificate revocation framework for named data networking},
author = {Tianyuan Yu and Hongcheng Xie and Siqi Liu and Xinyu Ma and Xiaohua Jia and Lixia Zhang},
url = {https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3517212.3558079},
doi = {10.1145/3517212.3558079},
isbn = {978-1-4503-9257-0},
year = {2022},
date = {2022-09-01},
urldate = {2022-09-01},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the 9th ACM Conference on Information-Centric Networking},
pages = {80–90},
publisher = {Association for Computing Machinery},
address = {New York, NY, USA},
series = {ICN '22},
abstract = {Named Data Networking (NDN) secures network communications by requiring all data packets to be signed upon production. This requirement makes usable and efficient NDN certificate issuance and revocation essential for NDN operations. In this paper, we first investigate and clarify core concepts related to NDN certificate revocation, then proceed with the design of CertRevoke, an NDN certificate revocation framework. CertRevoke utilizes naming conventions and trust schema to ensure certificate owners and issuers legitimately produce in-network cacheable records for revoked certificates. We evaluate the security properties and performance of CertRevoke through case studies. Our results show that deploying CertRevoke in an operational NDN network is feasible.},
keywords = {certificate revocations, Security, trust management},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {inproceedings}
}